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This study aims at investigating the effect of IFRS convergence on earning manipulation of companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchanges (IDX). Data were gathered from the annual reports of the companies. Samples are determined 
using purposive sampling and resulted in 51companies. Earning manipulation is measured by Beneish M-Score and then is 
analysed using Wilcoxon Sign Rank test. Research findings showed there was no significant difference in earning 
manipulation before and after IFRS convergence. In other words, the IFRS convergence did not decrease earning 
manipulation practices among companies used as sample in this study 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Earning manipulation has been considered as 
interesting issue in accounting literature in the last two 
decades and has attracted  accounting scholars to 
investigative such an issue. It is believed that earning 
manipulation may occur because of lack of transparency 
in providing accounting information, especially the 
implementation of national accounting standards. This is 
the reason why most countries, including Indonesia, are 
motivated to adopt International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) as basis for preparing and presenting 
accounting information. In 2012, Indonesia has been 
completely converged to IFRS and IAI will continuosly 
adapt to IFRS changes. By doing so, the IFRS 
convergence is believed by IAI to produce high quality 
financial reports and eventually reduce fraudulent 
financial statements, especially earning manipulation. 
The increasing number of countries adopting IFRS 
has attracted accounting scholars to investigate such 
adoption [2]. However, it is questionable whether the 
implementation of IFRS can reduce earning manipulation. 
In fact, a number of studies show contradicting findings. 
On one hand, companies espousing IFRS tend to publish 
more information which makes them more transparent 
and reduce earning management [12];  [2]; [13]; [14]; 
[15]. On the other hand, several studies provided 
empirical evidence that IFRS did not prevent management 
to involve in earning manipulation [17]; [18]; [19]; [20]; 
[21]; [22]. Unfortunately, it is not easy to find empirical 
studies on the IFRS convergence and earning 
manipulation in emerging markets, especially in 
Indonesia.  
The main objective of this study is to investigates the 
effect of IFRS convergence on earning manipulation of 
the companies. Hence, this study contributes to studies on 
earning manipulation before and after the IFRS 
convergence committed by companies in an emerging 
capital market. Moreover, this study employs  Beneish M-
Score as proxy of earning manipulation.  
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2. IFRS CONVERGENCE AND EARNING 
MANIPULATION 
Implementatiton of IFRS-convergent accounting 
standards can be related to compliance theory as proposed 
by Cialdini and Goldstein [23]. They believe that business 
organizations can be seen as utilitarian-calculative one. 
Indeed, business organizations are calculative in regard to 
how the implementation or adoption of any rules or 
regulations provide them with some benefits instead of 
having liabilities. Therefore, companies will implement 
and comply with accounting standards in the preparation 
of financial statement as long as they believe that such 
standards contain beneficiary elements for them. 
Compliance theory explains the reason why companies 
eager to comply with IFRS. As global accounting 
standards, IFRS are believed to boost comparability of 
financial reports which is really beneficial for companies.  
According to Bova & Pereira, IFRS adoption boosted 
transparency of financial information in Kenya as the fact 
that IFRS decreases managerial discretion and enforces 
greater disclosure requirements compared to domestic 
accounting standards[24]. Moreover, Barth, Landsman, 
and. Lang [13] confirm that firms which adopted 
international accounting standards were less involved in 
earning management than those keep employing domestic 
accounting standards in their financial reports. Therefore, 
this study proposes hypothesis as follow: 
HA: Earning manipulation practice in the period after 
IFRS convergence is lower than that in the period 
before IFRS convergence. 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
Beneish M-Score [25] is used as a measure of earning 
manipulation. This Score consists of eight indexes 
calculated from data of two consecutive year annual 
reports (except for Total Accruals to Total Assets-
TATA): Day’s Sales Receivables Index (DSRI), Gross Margin 
(GMI), Asset Quality Index (AQI), Sales Growth Index (SGI), 
Depreciation Index (DEPI), Sales, General and Administrative 
expenses Index (SGAI), Leverage Index (LVGI), and Total 
Accruals to Total Assets (TATA). Based on those indexes 
the Beneish Model takes a company’s results of these 
eight variables and applies them in the following formula: 
M = -4.84 + 0.92*DSRI + 0.528*GMI + 0.404*AQI + 
0.892*SGI + 0.115*DEPI – 0.172*SGAI + 
4.679*TATA – 0.327*LVGI 
In the Beneish Model, a score of greater than -2.22 (i.e., 
less of a negative) shows that there is high possibility of 
earning manipulation.  
The population consist of companies listed in the IDX 
for the period before IFRS (2007) and after IFRS 
convergence (2013). Samples are companies with the 
following criteria: 1) publish complete annual reports in 
the IDX website; 2) adopted Indonesian Rupiahs (IDR) as 
currency in their annual reports; 3) exhibited the use of 
IFRS as basis of preparing financial reports. Wilcoxon-
Signed Rank Test (non-parametric) is applied to test the 
hypothesis (with significance level at 0.05) by comparing 
two paired samples (before and after IFRS convergence. 
Table.1.  Sample Selection 
Sample Criteria Companies 
Listed in the IDX 2013 445 
Did not published its fin. statement in 
2013 
(40) 
Used foreign currency (not in IDR) (22) 
Did not provide complete information (176) 
Number of qualified companies  207 
Companies with unavailable financial 
data  in 2006 for Beneish ratio 
(156) 
Number of samples 51 
 
4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
A number of all companies did not have data 
required in the study. Samples of 51 observed companies 
in this study can be seen in Table 1. Table 2 described 
descriptive statistics of Beneish M-Score before and after 
IFRS convergence. 
Table.2. Beneish M-Score 
 N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
BEF IFRS 51 -8.64 0.43 -2.84 1.20 
AFT IFRS 51 -7.55 -0.05 -2.77 1.22 
Valid N (listwise) 51     
Table.3.  Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test  (Before VS After 
IFRS) 
 AFT IFRS – BEF IFRS 
Z -.769a 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .442 
a. Based on negative ranks 
 
It can be seen from Table 2 that in the period before 
IFRS Beneish M-Score has mean value of -2.84, with 
0.43 maximum value, -8.64 minimum value and 1.20 
standard deviation value. The value of standard 
deviation—lower than its mean value—means that each 
Beneish M-Score has relatively low variation. In other 
words, there are only little differences in each scores. The 
period after IFRS has similar results with mean value of -
2.77; maximum value of -0.05; minimum value of -7.55 
and standard deviation value of 1.22. Since the mean 
value is higher than its standard deviation value, these 
figures implied that this period has also relatively low 
variation. It means there are only small differences 
between each M-Score.  
7067 
    
Adv.Sci.Lett.Vol.23,No.8,August 2017             1936-6612/2011/4/400/008                doi: https://doi.org/10.1166/asl.2017.9291 
 
Based on normality test, W value are 0,625 and 0,703 
not exceeds of 1 in both period. It means that data are not 
normally distributed. Since the data are not normal, non-
parametric test was employed to analyse data. 
From Table 3, it can be seen that the value of the 
Asymp. Significant (2-tailed) is higher than the 
significance level used in this study (0.05) concluding that 
hypothesis is not supported.  This means that there is no 
statistically significant difference in Beneish M-Score 
between period before IFRS and period after IFRS.  This 
findings is in contrary with the arguments and findings of 
other studies which believed that implementation of IFRS 
reduce the practice of earning management or 
manipulation[10][3][5]. However, finding of this study is 
similar to that by Ton [28] showing that there was no 
difference in the earning management practice after the 
IFRS adoption in Dutch companies.  
There are several reasons why IFRS adoption 
(convergence) was not able to deter earning manipulation. 
According to Ton [28]  country specific factors play an 
important role in the success of IFRS implementation. 
Indeed, mandatory adoption of IFRS is more succesful in 
countries with stronger investor protection [11]. 
Furthermore there are three factors that affect the 
adoption of IFRS in deterring earning manipulation (Ton 
2011):  (1) the quality of the standards that were used 
before IFRS, (2) the country’s legal and political system 
and (3) the financial reporting incentives of companies in 
that country. The three factors may need a comprehensive 
study which is beyond the area of this research. 
Additionally, the Beneish M-Score seems to be not 
suitable for Indonesian companies because a lot of 
companies were eliminated as observed sample due to 
incomplete information. This may deteriorate of the 
research findings. 
5. CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS 
This study is intended to analyze the effect of IFRS 
convergence on earning manipulation practice. The 
findings showed that IFRS convergence does not have 
any significant impact on earning manipulation practice in 
Indonesia. By using Beneish M-Score, this research 
compared Beneish M-Scores (as proxy of earning 
manipulation) between the period before and after IFRS 
convergence. This study found that there was no 
significant difference in Beneish M-Scores before and 
after IFRS convergence. This implies that adoption of 
IFRS did not decrease earning manipulation among 
samples used in this research. This study contibuted to 
studies on earning manipulation in regard to IFRS 
convergence especially from emerging capital markets.  
Despite the interesing  findings, this study suffered from a 
limitation. Beneish M-Score apparently does not fit with 
the characteristics of Indonesian companies. More than 
150 companies were excluded from observed samples due 
to incomplete data.  
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